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ZONING AMENDMENTS-THE PRODUCT OF JUDICIAL OR
QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTION
Because the use of rezoning to make specific land-use-control decisions is
so widespread ... developers and their attorneys have joined in the game
and have ceased to regard rezoning as a legislative matter; instead, they
approach it for what it is, a specific development decision.'
Mosf of the bench2 and the bar3 have traditionally regarded "zoning"
with considerable distaste and have attempted to chart their legal careers
around what they regard as a potential quagmire. Zoning disputes, accord-
ingly, are often handled like "hot potatoes"-shunted to a few specialists
or resolved with all possible dispatch and frequently in a cursory manner.
This comment may cause unrest for those who argue for this "hands off"
approach, since it advocates a course which would produce considerable
judidal activity by intruding upon an area which traditionally has been re-
garded as legislative. Specifically, this comment will analyze zoning amepd-
ments from a precedential and practical standpoint to determine whether
they are legislative or judicial/quasi-judicial 4 acts. Brief consideration will
be given to the consequences which result from the current practice of
labeling rezonings as legislative acts, and to the changes which would oc-
cur if most zoning amendments were held to be the product of judicial ac-
tion.
I. THE TRADITIONAL LABEL-LEGISLATIVE
[Tlhe ... amendment of a zoning regulation or ordinance is a legislative
act .... 5
The above quotation represents the overwhelming majority view
throughout the United States.0 From it flows the strong presumption of
constitutionality which attaches to legislative action.7 Although this pre-
sumption is rebuttable,8 the burden which the opponent of the zoning
'Craig, Discretionary Land-Use Controls the Iron Whim of the Public, in PROCEINGS O
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 14 (1971) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as CRAIG).
2 See R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAmE 101 (1966).
3 ld. at 89.
4 Judicial and quasi-judicial are used interchangeably throughoat this comment. It is rec-
ognized that there is a distinction. See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 62,
217 A.2d 578, 583 (1966). For the purposes of this comment, however, it is submitted that
this distinction is unimportant.
5 Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3, 233 N.E.2d 500, 501 (1968).
GSee, e.g., Frankel v. City and County of Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063 (1961);
Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Robinson v. City of Bloomfield
Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957); Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d 155, 216 N.I,2d
877 (1966); O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1969).
7 1 K. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDEAR-
SON].
s Id. at 69.
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change must carry is quite formidable. Generally, it is said that the op-
ponent of legislative action must prove, either by dear and convincing
evidenceP or beyond a reasonable doubt,'0 that the zoning amendment as
embodied in an ordinance or regulation bears substantial relation to the pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or welfare. This requirement is commonly stated
in terms similar to the "fairly debatable" test laid down by the Supreme
Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.: "If the validity of the legislative das-
sification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control."" Furthermore, classification as "legislative"
has a dramatic impact on due process requirements. 2 While they may have
the right to notice and the right to be heard, 3 parties interested in a zoning
change have no right to be represented by counsel, 4 to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses,' 5 or to have made a record of the entire proceeding which
includes the findings and conclusions of the legislative body, 6 unless these
procedural safeguards are required by statute or rule. In most cases, how-
ever, some of these procedural safeguards will be required. For example,
parties interested in zoning amendment in Columbus, Ohio, are entitled to
notice,17, have a right to be heard,'5 may be represented by an attorney, 9
and have access to a record of the entire proceeding.20 Absent from this list
and generally absent in most other local government zoning procedures is
the right of cross-examination and the requirement that the decision-making
body make findings and conclusions in support of its decision.
Thus, it is seen that the legislative label carries with it limited procedural
safeguards and limited judicial review.21 At least in theory, this combina-
tion should not lead to corruption or abuse of individual rights. Since the
legislative process is highly visible, and since legislative action has a broad
9 Id. § 2.17.
'Old. § 2.18.
" Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (emphasis added).
12 "In legislation ... there is no constititional right to any hearing whatoever." R. PARKER,
AD ISTRATMV LAW 169 (1952) [hereinafter cited as PARKER].
13 See Hart v. Bayless Investment & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 389, 346 P.2d 1101, 1108
(1959); but see Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 644 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963); PARKER, .utra
note 12, at 37, 169.
14 Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 644 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963); PARXEE. supra note 12, at
37, 169.
15 id.
19 Id.
17 COLUMMUS ZONING CODE § 3313.04 (1967).
18 The right to be heard is specified in a rule of council which permits the proponents an
opponents to each have three speakers who can speak for up to three minutes each.
19 The right to be represented by an attorney is not set forth in any rule or ordinance but is
an existing practice which is apparently not open to question.
2 0 COLI!jiUS CITY CHARTER § 8 (1914).
2 1 AU MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE commentary to Article 8, at 204 (19(8).
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based impact, it should be self-remedying at the polls. 22  Unfortunately
these theoretical teachings do not appear to be true where rezonings are
involved. Instead, because of the procedural informality and limited judi-
cial review which accompany legislative action, the presence of impropri.
eties looms large,23 and individual rights are often sacrificed either on the
alter of public opinion24 or ex parte over a lunch at the club.25 Sadly,
this conduct seldom produces a ripple in the political pond because most
rezonings concern only a very small segment of the electorate.
Elimination of the aforementioned abuses can be accomplished through
the elimination of procedural informality and the requirement for more
thorough judicial review. One way to accomplish this result is through
the enactment of legislation prescribing procedures which are adequate
to protect the interests affected by rezonings. It is submitted that this ap-
proach is unnecessary because most rezonings are judicial rather than leg-
islative, and the procedural safeguards and standards of judicial review
applicable to judicial functions-which are designed to protect individual
interests-should be adequate to protect the interests affected by rezon-
ings. This assertion is not generally accepted, however, as may be illus-
trated through examination of several judicial decisions holding that re-
zonings are legislative procedures.
Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides for appeals
from administrative orders of specified bodies of political subdivisions, has
generated considerable litigation focused on the legislative-administrative 0
distinction in rezoning disputes. This litigation sheds light on the typical
judicial response to a challenge that a zoning amendment is a judicial act
and on the "prevailing rule" applied by the courts.
22 This is apparently the underlying reason for the strong presumption which attaches to leg.
islative action. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
23The presence of improprieties has caused one author to remark that, "One of zoning's
primary failings is' that it has become a 'marketable commodity.'" Balk, Invitation to Bribery,
HARPER'S, Oct. 6, 1966, at 18 quoted in Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TE1MP.
L Q. 267, 282 (1968). For a fascinating study of municipal zoning improprieties see Frellich
and Larson, Conflicts of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal for Regulation of Municipal Train-
actions, 38 U. M. K. C. L REv. 373, 390-98 (1970).
24 There can be little doubt that the popularity of a proposed zoning amendment is a factor
of considerable significance to the councilmen or commissioners who will either approve or dis.
approve it. See C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND TACTCS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 117 (1969).
25This threat follows from the fact that councilmen are regarded as legislators to whom
one can privately argue his case. C. CRAWvFORD, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN MUNICIPAL
ZONING 106 (1969).
20 It is submitted that judicial references to administrative action in rezoning cases have been
imprecise. This follows from the fact that administrative action involves either rule making,
which in an ordinance by a legislative body would be legislative action, or an adjudication.
It appears that reference only to the former is intended by the courts. Otherwise an attempted
comparison between legislative and administrative functions in rezoning cases could be wholly
illusory. It is suggested, therefore, that where the term administrative is used by courts quoted
in this comment, the substitution of the terms adjudicative, judicial, or quasi-judicial would be
more precise.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio in Berg v. City of Struthers2 pointed out
that the Ohio Administrative Appeals Act (Chapter 2506, Ohio Revised
Code) does not permit appeals from acts of legislative bodies. The terse
two sentence per curiam opinion implies that the city council is a legislative
body outside the scope of this statute, and characterizes the council's re-
fusal to grant the requested zoning change as "legislative action." Wyhy
the action is so characterized, other than by implication from the legisla-
tive character of the council, is not explained. After considering the con-
verse of Berg, an action amending a zoning ordinance vice inaction in fail-
ure to amend, and holding that this too was legislative action, -8 the court
in Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park20 then exposed for public view the
test it was applying in drawing the line between administrative and legis-
lative action. Quoting from the prominent case of Kelley v. John,-" the
court stated:
The crucial test for determining that which is legislative from that which is
administrative or executive is whether the action taken was one making
a law, or executing or administering a law already in existence 31
The refusal of the city council of Fairview Park to approve a plan for re-
subdivision of land which complied with the terms of the existing zoning
ordinance was, therefore, an administrative act.3 2 In the recent case of
Meyers v. Schiering,33 the same test was applied in holding that an ordi-
nance passed by the city council of Fairfield, Ohio, approving the location
of a sanitary land fill in an existing "heavy industrial" district was the
product of administrative action3 4 and, hence, not subject to referendum
proceedings available under the Ohio constitution for legislative action of
a city council.
While the "prevailing rule"3 5 of Kelley v. John as applied by the
Supreme Court of Ohio may be convenient to an overworked judge faced
with staking out the boundaries between legislative and judicial action, it
is nevertheless apparent that this rule is form oriented. If, for example,
instead of passing the resolution granting the permit for the operation of
the sanitary land fill the Fairfield city council had created a "sanitary land
27Berg v. City of Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964).
28 Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d 155,216 N.E.2d 877 (1966).
29 Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 NY.2d 500 (1963).
3OKelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
31 Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 4,233 N.Y.2d 500, 502 (1968).
32 Id.
33 Meyers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11,271 N.E.2d 864 (1971).
34 In M eyers the existing zoning ordinance created a heavy industrial district within which a
sanitary land fill could be operated if a permit for the land fill was obtained from city council.
The Fairfield zoning code required the city council to approve the location of the sanitary land
fill before it granted 2 permit. Id. at 13,271 N.E.2d at 866.
35 See quotation accompanying note 31 supra, City of Bowie v. County Cormm'rs for Prince
George's County, 258 Md. 454,463,267 A.2d 172, 177 (1970).
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use" district in its zoning code and had passed an ordinance rezoning the
land for "sanitary land use," the legislative label would have applied,
Yet in both cases the same substantive factors would have been considered
by the council before making its decision.30 It appears, therefore, that
under the Kelley test as applied, characterization as either legislative or
administrative turns merely on the presence of succeeding levels of ordi.
nance generality and disregards the nature of the ordinance and its relative
impact." It is submitted that this test by itself is artificial and that a
proper test for determining what is legislative and what is judicial must
consider primarily the nature of the ordinance enacted and its relative im-
pact.
II. THE HAZY LINE:
LEGISLATIVE VERSUS QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTION
It is elementary that governmental bodies, tribunals, agencies, boards (and
by whatever other appellations they may be known), and officials, in the
performance of their public duties, exercise functions that are divided into
three general categories: executive, judicial, and legislative.38
There is little controversy about the capacity of city councils, boards of
county commissioners, or boards of township trustees to act other than
legislatively. As the above quotation indicates, it is clear that these deci-
sion-making bodies perform not only legislative but also executive and ju-
dicial functions.39 Unfortunately any clarity vanishes when an attempt is
made to stake out the boundary between what is legislative, executive,
and judicial.40 Confusion abounds, and as a result proceedings are often
labeled legislative when in reality they involve a combination of legislative,
judicial, or executive action.41
In spite of the confusion over the distinction between legislative and
judicial action, it is nevertheless possible to discern characteristics peculiar
to each category. First, judicial action is narrow in scope, focusing on spe-
cific individuals42 or on specific situations,43 while legislative action is open-
3OThis assumes that the Fairfield zoning code specified no standards to be met before the
permit would issue. The language of the case, which quotes from § 525.02 of the Fairfield
zoning code, indicates the absence of standards: "[U]nless the location of such use shall have
been approved by the city council .. ." Meyers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 13, 271 N.E.
2d 864, 866 (1971).
3
7 See note 59 infra for a suggested test which would take these factors into consideration.
38 Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 62, 217 A.2d 578, 582 (1966).
39 See id.; 1 E. YOKMLY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 74, at 179 (1956); B. BURRUS,
ADMINIsRATivB LAW AND LOCAL GovmRmiENT 108 (1963), [hereinafter cited as BURRUS].
40 Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 62, 217 A.2d 578, 583 (1966).
41 Id.; see BURRus, note 39 supra.
42 See, e.g., Charles Green's Son v. Salas, 31 F. 106, 107 (S.D. Ga. 1887) (the naturalization
of an alien as a citizen of United States); In re McGarry, 380 II 359, 365,44 N.3.2d 7, 10 (1942)
(the action of a municipal judge in admitting a person to bail); In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527,
534, 26 A.2d 335, 339 (1942) (the suspension or disbarment of an attorney); cl. Fuchs, Pro-
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ended, affecting a broad class of individuals or situations. 4  This charac-
teristic, which is based upon the relative impact of the action, was appar-
ently relied upon by the Supreme Court in Bi-Afetallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization45 to distinguish its prior holding in Londoner
v. Denver!' Faced with the task of justifying the recognition of the right
to a hearing in Londoner with the denial of the same right in Bi-Alfeallic,
the Court reasoned:
A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exception-
ally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they
had a right to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general
determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assess-
ments in a county have been laid.47
This distinction appears to be sound; a large group is generally much
better equipped to protect itself in the absence of procedural safeguards
than are a few isolated individuals.
Secondly, legislative action results in the fortnulation of a general rule
or policy, while judicial action results in the application of a general rule
or policy. 8 Normally, this dichotomy will see the legislative body passing
a law and the judicial body applying it. But as pointed out before,4 the
dichotomy is not always accurate because both legislative and judicial func-
tions can be and often are vested in a single body.w0 When this occurs,
definitional difficulties arise where particular consequences turn on whether
the action is legislative or judicial.51
Thirdly, it is generally stated that judicial action is retrospective, 2 de-
termining -[t]he rights and duties of parties under existing law and with
relation to existing facts . .. ."' By contrast, legislative action is said to
be prospective,' determining "[w]hat the law shall be in future cases.
cedure in Administrative Rule Mraking, 52 HARv. L REv. 259, 263 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as Fuchs].
4 3 See, e.g., Sears v. Atlantic City, 73 NJ.L. 710, 711, 64 A. 1062, 1063 (1906) (a municipal
ordinance providing for the paving of a street at the cost of benefited property).
"4See, e.g., Gorman v. City of Peabody, 312 Mass. 560, 564-65, 45 N.E.2d 939, 943
(1942) (vote of a school committee increasing salaries of all public school teachers); Lone Star
Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 307, 153 S.W.2d 681, 693 (1941) (rate making by the Railroad
Commission); cf. Fuchs, supra note 42.
4 5 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
4 6 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
47 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915).
48 Id., see Kuberski v. Haussermann, 113 N.J.L. 162, 168, 172 A.738, 741 (1934).
49 See the quotation accompanying note 38 supra.
5oSee Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3, 233 N.E.2d 500, 501 (196s).
51 Id.
52 See BuRUs, supra note 39, at 17 n.62; Fuchs, supra note 42, at 260.
53 Gulnac v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Bergen, 74 NJ.L 543, 546, 61
A. 998, 1000 (1906) (concurring opinion).
5 4 See note 52 supra.
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. . ." This simple distinction, however, is of very limited utility since to
some extent judicial action is predicated on its future impact, and legisla-
tive action is based upon historic events.
Lastly, it has been held that the test for judicial action is whether it is
the result of judgment or discretion.Y This standard is rejected as un-
sound because "[ilt is not true that every function wherein judgment and
discretion are exercised is a judicial function."' s Legislative and executive
action require judgment and discretion just as much as judicial action. The
distinguishing factor is that legislative discretion is circumscribed only by
constitutional provisions whereas judicial and executive discretion are lim-
ited by statutes and the common law as well.
Although the above discussion does not purport to provide an easy solu-
tion to the problem of distinguishing legislative from judicial action, it
does make possible the formulation of a test which should have general
validity. 9 This test would be helpful in resolving most cases and, in par-
ticular, the problem of distinguishing legislative from judicial action as it
arises in the context of zoning amendments.
III. THE ZONING AMENDMENT:
LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL?
Initially, it may be argued the authority . . . as concerns enactment or
amendment of zoning laws properly may be denominated a legislative
function when invoked for classification of all property for zoning pur-
poses....
It is difficult to understand, however, upon what basis the relief ex-
tended by adoption of (an] . . . ordinance varying the original plan like-
wise can be called a legislative function.60
As the above quotation indicates, the action of a lozal government in ini-
tially enacting a comprehensive zoning ordinance will be assumed to be
legislative action. Furthermore, it is assumed that major changes 1 to the
zoning map are also the product of legislative action. However, as it will
be developed below, other changes to the zoning map, the majority of all
5 Newell v. Franklin, 30 R.I. 258,263, 74 A. 1009, 1011 (1910)
56 See Fuchs, supra note 42, at 262.
5T See Pyatt v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 555, 89 A.2d 1, 4
(1952).
58Hammer v. Smith, 11 Ariz. 420,423,94 P. 1121 (1908).
59 This test is: Does the action formulate a general rule or policy which is applicable to an
open class of persons, interests, or situations, or does the action apply a general rule or policy
to specific persons, interests, or situations? If the answer is yes to the latter half of the question,
then legislative action is present. If the answer is yes to the first half of the question, then there
is judicial action.
60 O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782, 786 (Okla. 1969) (Berry, V. C. J. and Blackbird
J., dissenting).
61 Major change will be assumed to involve 20 or more acres.
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zoning amendments, 62 should be considered the product of either judicial
or quasi-judicial action.
The fundamental inquiry into whether a zoning amendment is the
product of legislative action or judicial/quasi-judicial action will incorpo-
rate the test formulated earlier.'3 Basically, this test involves the determi-
nation of whether action produces a general rule or policy which is appli-
cable to an open class of individuals, interests, or situations, or whether
it entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests, or situations." If the former determination is satisfied, there is
legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is judi-
cial.
While performance standards establishing maximum noise levels or a
set back requirement might be statements of land use policy or general
rules and hence legislative, it is difficult to visualize a typical zoning amend-
ment of a few acres falling into this category. It would, instead, appear
that zoning amendments entail the imposition of burdens or the confer-
ence of privileges with respect to specific tracts of land"' and thus approxi-
mate the judicial model. Nevertheless, the notion that a zoning amend-
6 2 Of 80"zoning changes taken at random from the 1970 COLUMMUS, OHIO CIr BuLLEMN,
64 involved zoning changes of less than 20 acres. Of this number 32 were of one acre or less,
21 were between one to five acres, eight were between five to 10 acres and three were between
10 to 20 acres.
6 3 See note 59 supra and the accompanying discussion.
6 U[Ilt is feasible to distinguish a general regulation from an order of specific applica-
tion on the basis of the manner in which the parties subject to it are designated. If
they are named, or if they are in effect identified by their relations to a piece of prop-
erty or transaction or institution which is specified, the order is one of specific applica-
tion. If they are not named, but the order applies to a designated class of persons or
situations, the order is a general regulation or rule .... [Tihe increase or reduction of
a single taxpayers assessment is different... from the order of state board raising or
lowering the assessments upon a given dass of property throughout a county.
Fuchs, supra note 42, at 264.
6 5 This fact has been recognized by several writers who have variously described the zoning
amendment process as "a specific development decision" or "a series of individual permissions."
CRAIG, supra note 1; Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, in
THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADNMINSTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES
23, 26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEW ZONING]; Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land
Use Control: Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in NEW ZONIG 3, [here-
inafter cited as Krasnowiecki]. The commentary to the ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPET.
CODE at 204 (1968) also recognized this and states:
As has been noted ... the principal problem of an end-state concept of land use con-
trol has been the zoning amendment. Since the concept denies the possibility that a
community may have no fixed idea as to its end state and that it may prefer to shape
its destiny as each applicant for development is received, it does not recognize the fact
that ans amendment may possess little, if anything, of the impersonal generality uhich
alone justifies the consequences we have learned to attach to the "legislative" label. As
a result, reviewing courts have been forced to struggle with local "legislative" decisions
which in theory are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, which require no ad-
vance statement of standards to guide the public officials who make them and which can
be made without a record, findings and reasons given, when in fact they are decisions
undertaken in favor of individual applicants-decisions whicb respond to the needs
and pressures of the occasion. (Emphasis added.)
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ment is a statement of land use policy, and hence legislative,00 appears to
be widely accepted. 7 Because of this disparity between what is apparent
and what is accepted, the proposition that a zoning amendment is a state-
ment of land use policy should be examined carefully.
Where a comprehensive land use plan has been adopted by the legis-
lative body, this plan is regarded as an overall statement of the local gov-
ernment's land use policy" and hence the product of legislative action.
Unfortunately, in many cases there is no existing statement of land use
policy, or the proposed zoning change does not conform to the existing
comprehensive plan. In the former case it can be contended that any ac-
tion constitutes a statement of land use policy, 0 and is therefore legislative
action. In the latter case, it can be argued that if the proposed change is
adopted it is the manifestation of new land use policy, and is accordingly
the product of legislative action as well. This analysis, however, errone-
ously equates the zoning change or its defeat with land use policy. In
reality, they are not the same. Instead, a correct statement of their rela-
tionship indicates that the zoning change or its defeat is the result of the
application of existing but often unstated land use policies 0 to a particular
tract of land-an adjudication. The fact that these policies are often un-
stated serves to obscure their relationship with the zoning amendment and
has resulted in the term policy being applied to the amendment itself.
A discussion of a hypothetical zoning case will serve to highlight this
distinction between land use policy and the application of land use policy.
If a local government enacts a zoning code which provides for a zoning
district that requires a minimum four acre lot size, the zoning code and
the four acre code provision represent land use policy. This policy is simply
that some land within the community will or does require a minimum of
four acre zoning for various reasons which can only be tested by the "fairly
debatable" test. This is true because the four acre ordinance is a general
rule or land use policy statement applying to an open ended class of situa-
tions and, therefore, is the product of legislative action. The same analy-
sis is not valid when a particular tract of land is rezoned for four acre
minimum lot size. This action involves the application of the stated land
08 This result is reached by substituting "one making policy" for "one making a law" In
the quotation accompanying note 31 supra.
67 See Krasnowiecki, supra note 65, at 5, 6.
08 It may be contended, however, that the portion of a comprehensive plan which details
the land uses throughout the community is not a statement of the plan's policy, but instead repre-
sents application of land use policies stated elsewhere in the plan or of unstated land use policies
to specific tracts of land.
69 See Krasnowiecki, supra note 65, at 6.
7 0 Examples of particular land use policies which are often unstated but which ate never-
theless applied to specific zoning amendments are: a policy conditioning approval of the zoning
amendment upon the guarantee of prompt development in accordance with an approved plot
plan, and a policy excluding mobile homes even though a mobile home district is provided In
the zoning code.
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use policy represented by the four acre ordinance7' plus the application of
several often unstated land use policies - to a particular tract of land-
judicial action. While the standard of review here would approximate
the "fairly debatable" test,73 important procedural safeguards would have
to be met in the interest of due process because of the judicial nature of
the action. These safeguards would include the requirement that the de-
cision be supported by findings which detail not only the unstated land
use policies but also the evidence which supports either a finding of these
policies' applicability or non-applicability. This assertion follows from the
fact that the four acre ordinance is not self-executing but requires the
presence of other land use policies to trigger it. A statement of these land
use policies and the facts which support them in each case should, accord-
ingly, be essential to the findings.7 4
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FINDING
QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTION
It should be evident that the determination that most zoning amend-
ments are the product of quasi-judicial action has no impact on the sub-
stantive validity of zoning itself. The mandate of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co."5 that zoning is a valid exercise of the police power is not affected.
What is affected, however, is the manner in which the police power is ex-
ercised. The recognition that zoning amendments are the product of judi-
cial or quasi-judicial action would mean that additional procedural re-
q1uirements must be adhered to in the name of due process. No attempt
will be made to detail these requirements." An effort will be made, how-
ever, to sketch out the most significant of these requirements and point out
several potential problem areas.
It is evident that the phrase "due process" has no precise meaning. 7
This can be seen from the statement by the Supreme Court that "The fun-
damental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . ..
71 By itself the four acre ordinance is not self-executing. Its application is dependent upon
the presence and use of other land use policies.
72 For examp!e, the policy that development of housing should correspond with the avail-
ability of water, sewer, and school services; the policy that only housing which can "pay its own
way" should be permitted; and the policy that open space should be preserved.
3 This assertion is based upon the assumption that courts would apply a standard of review
similar to that applied to decisions of boards of zoning adjustment. That standard is generally
whether the decision is "[i]legal, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion; if it is arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore an abuse of discretion; or if it is a manifest, flagrant abuse of discre-
tion." 3 ANZERsoN, supra note 7, § 21.16, at 58-89 (footnotes omitted).
74 3 ANDERSON, supra note 7, § 16A3, at 248.
7
t Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
76 For a general discussion of the procedural requirements accompanying judicial functions of
local administrative agencies see Merrill, The Local Administrative Agencies, 22 VAND L REV.
775, 791-809 (1969).
7 7 PARKER, supra note 12, at 39.
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at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, 78  The term "mean-
ingful" is necessarily vague, and, as a result, the surrounding circumstances
must be looked at to add substance to the term. This is the nature of due
process.
Thus, it is apparent that due process does not require uniformity of
procedure. Procedural requirements will vary with the circumstances. A
capital crime case, therefore, must have more procedural safeguards than a
,misdemeanor case or the hearing of a welfare recipient whose benefits may
be terminated, if due process is to be satisfied. Since this is the case, what
procedural requirements does due process demand for the zoning hearing?
An adequate jumping-off point for the answer to this question is the often
quoted statement of Justice Brandeis that what due process assures is:
[Tjhat the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no find-
ings shall be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be heard;
that the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a
fair trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law
and procedure were observed.79
Turning first to the requirement that the hearing be conducted by an
impartial tribunal, it should be clear that a person who owns an interest
in a tract of land or who is directly affected by the rezoning should not vote
upon the zoning amendment. To hold otherwise would completely de-
stroy any notions of "impartiality" or "meaningfulness." This desirable
result has been reached in proceedings before zoning boards of adjustment
where they are performing quasi-judicial functions, but it stands in stark
contrast to the current practice where the legislative label is applied to
rezonings. There the majority rule precludes an examination of a legisla-
tor's motives.8 0
The requirements of due notice and an opportunity to be heard should
be regarded as fundamental to a zoning hearing if the rights of interested
parties are to be protected. Ex parte decision mdng with its inherent
capacity for abuse has no place in a rezoning hearing where the issue to be
decided does not require immediate or emergency action. The questions
still remain, however, as to whom should notice be given, how should no-
tice be given, what should notice contain, and how can the interested parties
be accommodated at the hearing. While not attempting to answer these
questions, it can be pointed out that the boards of zoning adjustment have
78 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267 (1970).
79 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (concurring opinion).
80 1 ANDERSON, supra note 7, § 4.18; see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 568 (1960). There have
been, as a result of the majority rule which is applicable to rezonings labeled as legislative, situ-
ations like Schauer v. Miami Beach where a councilman voted to approve a rezoning where
property owned by him increased $600,000 in value by reason of the rezoning, and the matter
was held not to be open to judicial inquiry. Schauer v. Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla,
1959).
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operated subject to the notice and hearing requirements of due process.
Furthermore, even though due process does not demand notice and a right
to be heard for a legislative hearing,8' most rezonings currently require
notice and afford interested parties an opportunity to be heard either by
statute, ordinance or rule. Thus, while the recognition that amendments
are the product of judicial action would present definitional difficulties,
as a practical matter probably no change to existing procedures affording
notice and an opportunity to be heard would be required in many com-
munities.
Requiring a rezoning hearing to be "consistent with the essentials of a
fair trial" does not mean that the hearing must abide by formal rules of
evidence."' It would, instead, seem to envision an opportunity to present
relevant evidence to the councilmen or commissioners and rebut evidence
offered by opposing interests through cross-examination! 3 It would, fur-
thermore, probably require that the decision makers refrain from ex parte
contacts or announce the content of these ex parte contacts at the hearing
so that interested parties could present evidence in rebuttal. Present pro-
cedure probably affords interested parties an opportunity to present evidence
and perhaps question adverse parties; however, ex parte contacts without
any disclosure requirements are currently regarded as an accepted prac-
tice.' Requiring elected representatives to cease all e-x parte contacts rele-
vant to rezonings or announce them at the rezoning hearing might, there-
fore, present problems because of the radical but not across-the-board
breakwith past practices. Moreover, the prospect of laymen acting pur-
suant to even informal rules of evidence might also present difficulties
which may or may not be curable through the retention of legal counsel to
assist them.
Finally there must be a record and findings which are adequate for
"[al court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure
were observed."8" Without an adequate record and findings, the court
would be unable to exercise any control over the decision making body."
These requirements, additionally, would have the positive effect of mak-
ing the decision makers more aware of their responsibility by requiring
greater self-discipline 7 and would provide a valuable source for commu-
nity enlightenment. Implementation of these requirements would, how-
81 PARKER, supra note 12, at 37, 169.
82 2 K. DA VIs, ADi., NISTATIVEm LAw TREAmTsB § 14.01 (1958); 3 ANDERsox, supra
note 7, § 16.31.
83 This right is generally recognized in hearings before boards of zoning adjustment. An-
not-, 27 A.LEL3d 1304 (1969).
84 See C. CnAwFoRD, STRATEGY AND TAcrTIcs IN MUNCIPAL ZONING 106 (1969).
85 See quotation accompanying note 79 supra.
86 Cf. Comment, Judicial Control Over Zoning Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform,
12 U.C.LA. L REV. 937, 947 (1965).
s Id. at 952.
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ever, present some problems of varying difficulty. The least difficult would
be the necessity for an adequate record. This could be provided by hir-
ing additional clerical help whose cost could be recouped by increasing
the application fees. The requirement for findings would present dif-
ficulties of a greater magnitude, at least, if the boards of zoning adjust-
ment are an indication of what is to be expected.8 ' There is, however, a
significant difference between the variance process and rezonings. In the
former, the interests at stake are relatively small. Consequently, procedural
abuse can easily escape detection. On the other hand, rezonings often have
an impact on land values running into the tens of thousands of dollars.
Thus, if procedural safeguards are applicable to rezonings, it is more likely
that the parties will use them and prosecute a vigorous appeal if they are
denied their use.
The above discussion of procedural requirements and problems is by no
means exhaustive. Procedural requirements should be considered in greater
depth with consideration being given to the particular situation in which
they would apply. Moreover, additional problems would undoubtedly arise
as most rezonings are recognized for what they are, the product of judicial
or quasi-judicial action.
V. CONCLUSION
The present procedural framework within which proposed zoning
amendments are determined is not satisfactory. 9 This condition stems
from the application of the legislative label to all rezonings. Although this
labeling has been questioned, it nevertheless represents the overwhelming
consensus of judicial opinion in this country. This apparently form ori-
ented labeling is strongly contested here. The basis for this disagreement
is found in the distinction between legislative and judicial action which
rests primarily on the spectrum of interests affected. Legislative action
creates a general rule or policy which will apply to an open-ended class of
interests, while judicial action applies a general rule or policy to specific
interests.
Rezonings of individual tracts of land, while mislabeled as statements
of new land use policy, are actually the application of often unstated land
use policies to specific interests-judicial action. Accordingly, due process
demands that rezonings be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards,
many of which are not presently utilized in rezoning hearings. Requiring
88 See Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Caso Study of Mlrul,
50 KY. L.J. 273, 324, 334 (1962); McBride, The Governmental I)ecsion.Alaking Structuro for
Land-Use Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INSTiTutrE ON PLANNING AND ZON-
ING 153, 170 (1968); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Dcstrue.
tire in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3, 13 (1969).
89 For example, there would be the problem of defining who would qualify as proper parties,
and the question would surely arise whether state administrative procedure acts were applicable,
The latter problem might produce special difficulties in "home rule" states.
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these safeguards would not be without its problems. Nevertheless, when
the effort which would be expended to resolve these problems is weighed
against the confusion, corruption, and abuse of individual rights which is
inherent in the process under the "legislative" label, it should be more than
offset by the advantages which would be gained.
Michael S. Holman
